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Abstract
In [2], Mavronicolas et al. presented a network game as an undirected graph whose
nodes are exposed to infection by attackers, and whose edges are selectively protected
by a defender. They showed that such a graph-theoretic game has no pure Nash equi-
librium unless the graph is trivial. In [5] a network game is generalized to one with
many defenders instead of a single player, so that there is a pure Nash equilibrium in
more general situations. In this paper, we define a new model with the roles of play-
ers interchanged. As a result, we provide a graph theoretic characterization of Nash
equilibrium of our new model.
1 Introduction
Game theory provides highly abstract tools which help us to represent and analyze interactive
situations. Their abstraction allows us to apply them across disciplines, from set theory
and logic to economic and biology. The most important notion in this approach is a Nash
equilibrium which represents a situation where no player has anything to gain by changing
his strategy unilaterally [3, 4].
Mavronicholas et al. [2] started a line of research of network games, that is, strategic
games on graphs with two types of players, attackers and a defender. Attackers attack a node
of the network to damage, and a defender is to protect the network by catching attackers
in some part of the network. Each attacker wishes to maximize the number of successful
(uncatched) attacks, whereas the defender aims at maximizing the number of attackers it
catches. Mavronicolas et al. [2] first showed that no game with the defender playing a single
edge (the Edge model) has a pure Nash equilibrium unless it is a trivial graph (see Theorem
4.3, [2] $)$ . They also defined a subclass of mixed Nash equilibria, called matching Nash
equilibria, which are solvable in non-deterministic polynomial time for graphs with certain
conditions (Theorem 5.3, [2]). Finally, they improved this non-deterministic algorithm into
a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for a bipartite graph (Theorem 6.3, [2]).
In [1], they considered a more general game, where the defender is able to scan a set of $k$
links of the network. First, they showed that the existence problem of pure Nash equilibria
is solvable in polynomial time. Then, they provided a graph-theoretic characterization of
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mixed Nash equilibria. Motivated by a class of polynomial time Nash equilibria, introduced
for the Edge model, they defined a k-matching profile that generalizes a matching profile,
and presented a polynomial time reduction for transforming any matching Nash equilibria of
any instance of the Edge model to a k-matching Nash equilibria on a correspondence instance
of their new model, and hence provided a characterization of graphs admitting k-matching
Nash equilibria.
Inspired by these model, we believe that by increase the number of defenders will improve
the quality of protection of the network. Therefore, in [5] we generalized their model by
allowing many defenders instead of single player in order to increase the defenders’ gain.
In this paper we introduce a new type of network game where attackers aim to damage the
network by attacking an edge, and defenders aim to protect the network by choosing a vertex.
Both attackers and defenders make individual decisions for their placement in the network,
seeking to maximize their objectives by pure strategies. We will discuss briefly the properties
of graph admitting pure Nash equilibrium presented in [5] in Section 2. In Section 3, we
introduced our new model of network game and provides a characterization of (pure) Nash
equilibria.
2 Network Games with Many Defenders
We consider an undirected graph $G=(V, E)$ where $V$ denotes a set of vertices and $E$ denotes
a set of edges. A vertex cover of $G$ is a vertex set $C_{V}\subseteq V$ such that for each edge $(u, v)\in E$
either $u\in C_{V}$ or $v\in C_{V}$ . A minimum vertex cover is one that has the minimum size. An
edge cover of $G$ is an edge set $C_{E}\subseteq E$ such that $\forall v\in V,$ $\exists e=(v, u)\in C_{E}$ . A matching $M$
of $G$ is a subset of $E$ such that no vertex is incident to more than one edge in $M$ (i.e. no
two edges in $M$ have a common vertex). A matching $M$ is said to be maximum (size $m$) if
for any other matching $M’,$ $m=|M|\geq|M’|$ . A vertex set $I_{V}\subseteq V$ is an independent set of
$G$ if for all pairs of vertices $u,$ $v\in I_{V},$ $(u, v)\not\in E$ . If $v$ is incident of an edge $e$ , then we write
$v\in e$ . We let $n_{V}(G)$ and $n_{E}(G)$ denote the number of vertices and edges in $G$ . Whenever no
confusion arises we write $n_{V}$ and $n_{E}$ instead of $n_{V}(G)$ and $n_{E}(G)$ , respectively. Before we
proceed to our new model, let see some characterization of (pure) Nash equilibrium in [5].
First, we see the General Model case defined as follows:
A game $\Gamma(G)=\langle \mathcal{N},$ $\mathcal{G}\rangle$ on graph $G$ is defined by:
$\bullet$ $\mathcal{N}=\mathcal{N}_{A}\cup \mathcal{N}_{D}$ is the set of players where
$-\mathcal{N}_{A}$ is a finite set of attackers (denoted by $a_{i},$ $1\leq i\leq\nu$ )
$-\mathcal{N}_{D}$ is a finite set of defenders (denoted by $d_{j},$ $1\leq j\leq\mu$ )
$\bullet$ $\mathcal{G}$ is a collection of subgraphs of $G$ , such that $G=\cup \mathcal{G}$
$\bullet$ The strategy set $S$ of $\Gamma(G)$ is $V^{\nu}\cross \mathcal{G}^{\mu}$
A profile $s$ is an element of $S$ , i.e., $s=\langle v_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $v_{\nu},$ $S_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $S_{\mu}\rangle\in S$ . Fix a profile $s$ . Define the
payoff of the players as follows. The individual Profit $(P_{8})$ of attacker $a_{i},$ $1\leq i\leq\nu$ , is given
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by
$P_{\epsilon}(a_{i})=\{\begin{array}{l}0 if v_{i}\in S_{j} for some j, 1\leq j\leq\mu 1 if v_{i}\not\in S_{j} for all j, 1\leq j\leq\mu\end{array}$
In other words, an attacker receives $0$ if it is caught by a defender, and 1 otherwise. The
individual Profit $(P_{\epsilon})$ of defender $d_{j},$ $1\leq j\leq\mu$ , is given by
$P_{\epsilon}(d_{j})=|\{v :$ $i, 1\leq i\leq\nu, v_{i}\in S_{j}\wedge v_{i}=v\}|$
representing the number of attacked vertices it catches. Finally, we define $A_{\epsilon}=\{v\in V$ :
$i,$ $1\leq i\leq\nu$ , where $v=v_{i}$ } and $D_{s}=\{C\in \mathcal{G}$ : $j,$ $1\leq j\leq\mu$ such that $C=S_{j}\}$ .
Definition 2.1. A profile $s$ is a Nash equilibrium iffor any $playerr\in\{a_{i}, d_{j}\},$ $P_{\epsilon}(r)\geq P_{\epsilon’}(r)$
for any profiles $s’$ which differs from $s$ only on the stmtegy of $r$ .
In other words, in a Nash equilibrium no player can improve its individual profit by
changing unilaterally his strategy.
Theorem 2.2. ([5]) The game $\Gamma(G)$ has a Nash equilibrium if and only if there exist $D\subset \mathcal{G}$
and $A\subset V$ which satisfy the following conditions:
(1) $|D|\leq\mu$ and $|A|\leq\nu$
(2) $\forall v\in V,$ $C\in D$ such that $v\in C$
(3) $\forall S\in D,$ $|A \cap V(S)|=\max_{C\in \mathcal{G}}|A\cap V(C)|$
For an Edge Model $(i.e., \mathcal{G}=E)$ , we have the following results.
Theorem 2.3. ([5]) If the number of attackers $\nu$ is strictly less than $n_{V}$ , then an edge model
$\Gamma(G)$ has a Nash equilibrium $s$ if and only if there exist $D$ and A which satisfy the following
conditions:
$\bullet$ $ConO|D|\leq\mu$ and $|A|\leq\nu$
$\bullet$ Conl $D$ is an edge cover $C_{E}$ of $G$
$\bullet$ Con2 $A$ is a vertex cover $C_{V}$ of the gmph $(V, D)$
$\bullet$ Con3 $A$ is an independent set $I_{V}$ in $G$
We have a particular case of edge model defined as follows.
Definition 2.4. For a gmph $G$, we have the following notations:
$\bullet$ $\Gamma_{\max}(G)$ denotes the game $\Gamma(G)$ where $\nu=n_{V}-m$ and $\mu=n_{E}$
$\bullet$ $\Gamma_{\min}(G)$ denotes the game $\Gamma(G)$ where $\nu=m$ and $\mu=n_{V}-m$
where $m$ is the size of a maximum matching in $G$ .
We investigated the complexity of finding a Nash equilibrium in these particular games.
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Theorem 2.5. ([5]) Let $G$ be a gmph. Then, we can compute a Nash equilibrium of $\Gamma_{\max}(G)$
in a non-deterministic polynomial time.
Pmof. Let $A$ be a maximal independent set of vertices, and $D$ the set of edges incident to a
vertex in $A$ . Then $A$ and $D$ satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2.3. $\square$
In order to treat $\Gamma_{\min}(G)$ , we need a particular graph called a star graph. A star $S_{k}$ is a
complete bipartite graph $K_{1,k}$ , that is a tree with one internal node and $k$ leaves. First, we
have the following definition.
Definition 2.6. A gmph $G$ said to have the property Prop $(^{*})$ if and only iffor a minimum
edge cover $C_{E}$ , there exists a map $f$ : $Varrow\{0,1\}$ such that
$\bullet$ $\forall(u, v)\in E,$ $f(u)+f(v)\geq 1$
$\bullet$ $\forall(u, v)\in C_{E}$ , we have $f(u)+f(v)=1$
$\bullet$ for any multiple-edge star gmph of $C_{E}$ with a center $u,$ $f(u)=0$
Theorem 2.7. ([5]) A game $\Gamma_{\min}(G)$ has a Nash equilibrium if and only if $G$ satisfies the
property Prop $(^{*})$ .
If $G$ is a bipartite graph or has no odd cycle, then the existence of such a map $f$ is
independent from the choice of the edge cover. Hence, a pure Nash equilibrium of $\Gamma_{\min}(G)$
can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 2.8. ([5]) If $G$ is a bipartite graph or has no odd cycle, then deciding whether the
game $\Gamma_{\min}(G)$ has a Nash equilibrium is in polynomial time.
3 New Strategic Model
As stated earlier, our new model is defined by interchanging the players’ roles. We obtained
a slightly different graph-theoretic characterization of Nash equilibria (Theorem 3.2).
Definition 3.1. Let $G=(V, E)$ be an undirected gmph with no isolated vertices. A new
stmtegic game $\Gamma_{\alpha,\delta}(G)=\langle \mathcal{N},$ $S\rangle$ on $G$ is defined as follows;
$\bullet$ $\mathcal{N}=\mathcal{N}_{A}\cup \mathcal{N}_{D}$ is the set of players where
$\mathcal{N}_{A}$ is a finite set of attackers $a_{i}$ , where $1\leq i\leq\alpha$
$\mathcal{N}_{D}$ is a finite set of defenders $d_{j}$ , where $1\leq j\leq\delta$
$\bullet$
$S=E^{\alpha}\cross V^{\delta}$ is a strategy set of $\Gamma_{\alpha,\delta}(G)$
A profile $s$ is an element of $S$ , i.e., $s=\langle e_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $e_{\alpha},$ $v_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $v_{\delta}\rangle\in S$ . Note that all players
make their choice simultaneously. The number of attackers is $\alpha$ and the number of defenders
is $\delta$ , for some fixed integers $\alpha,$ $\delta\geq 1$ . Now fix a profile $s$ of the game $\Gamma_{\alpha,\delta}(G)$ , we define the
expected income (payoff) of the players as follows.
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$\bullet$ The individual Profit $(P_{8})$ of attacker $a_{i},$ $1\leq i\leq\alpha$ , is given by
$P_{\epsilon}(a_{i})=\{\begin{array}{l}0 if v_{j}\in e_{i} for some j, 1\leq j\leq\delta 1 if v_{j}\not\in e_{i} for all j, 1\leq j\leq\delta\end{array}$
In other words, an attacker receives $0$ if it is caught by a defender, and 1 otherwise.
$\bullet$ The individual Profit $(P_{\epsilon})$ of defender $d_{j},$ $1\leq j\leq\delta$ , is given by
$P_{s}(d_{j})=|\{e :$ $i, 1\leq i\leq\alpha, v_{j}\in e_{i}\wedge e=e_{i}\}|$
representing the number of attacked edges it saves.
Before we proceed to the theorem, we $defi_{I1}e$ a set
$A_{\epsilon}=\{e\in E:$ $i,$ $1\leq i\leq\alpha$ , where $e=e_{i}\}$
$D_{\epsilon}=\{v\in V:$ $j,$ $1\leq j\leq\delta$ such that $v=v_{j}\}$
Theorem 3.2. The game $\Gamma_{\alpha,\delta}(G)$ has a Nash equilibrium if and only if:
(1) $|D|\leq\delta$ and $|A|\leq\alpha$
(2) $\forall e\in E,$ $v\in D$ such that $v\in e$
(3) $\forall v\in D,$ $|A \cap E(v)|=\max_{v\in V}|A\cap E(v)|$
where $E(v)=\{e\in E:v\in e\}$ .
Proof. Suppose $\Gamma_{\alpha,\delta}(G)$ has a Nash equilibrium, say $s$ . Let $A=A_{\epsilon}$ and $D=D_{\epsilon}$ . Then, item
(1) is straightforward. To prove (2), suppose that there exists $\overline{e}\in E$ such that $v\not\in\overline{e}$ for all
$v\in D$ . Then, any attacker can receive 1 by switching to $\overline{e}$ . Since $s$ is a Nash equilibrium,
each attacker must already gets 1, which means that all defenders receive $0$ . However, any
defender can get at least 1 by switching to a vertex incident to an attacked edge, which
contradicts to the assumption that $s$ is Nash equilibrium. Similarly if (3) does not hold,
there would be a $v_{j}\in D$ and $v$ such that $|A\cap E(v_{j})|<|A\cap E(v)|$ . Thus, the defender $j$
would find it beneficial to change his choice from $v_{j}$ to $v$ , which contradicts to the fact that
$s$ is Nash equilibrium.
Conversely, suppose there exist $A$ and $D$ satisfying condition (1), (2) and (3). By (1), let
$s$ be a profile so that each element of $A$ (resp. $D$ ) is chosen by at least one attacker (resp.
defender). By (2), no matter how an attacker changes his strategy, he will always get $0$ . Thus,
an attacker has no motif to change his strategy. By (3), if a defender changes his choice, it
won’t increase his profit, since the number of protected edges is already maximum. $\square$
Theorem 3.3. If $\alpha$ is the size of a maximum matching in $G$ and $\delta=2\alpha$ , then the game
$\Gamma_{\alpha,\delta}(G)$ has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let $A$ be a maximum matching in $G$ and $D$ be the set of vertices incident to an edge
in $A$ . Then obviously condition (1) and (3) of Theorem 3.2 hold. For (2), assume that there
were $\overline{e}\in E$ such that $v\not\in\overline{e}$ for all $v\in D$ . Then, $A\cup\{\overline{e}\}$ is also a matching, which contradicts
with the maximality of A. $\square$
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Definition 3.4. The gmph $G$ is bipartite if $V=V_{0}\cup V_{1}$ for some disjoint vertex sets $V_{0},V_{1}\subseteq$
$V$ so that for each edge $(u, v)\in E,$ $u\in V_{0}$ and $v\in V_{1}$ $($ or $u\in V_{1}$ and $v\in V_{0})$ .
Theorem 3.5. For a bipartite gmph $G$, a game $\Gamma_{\alpha,\delta}(G)$ has a Nash equilibrium if and only
if $\alpha,$ $\delta\geq m$ , where $m$ is the size of the maximum matching in $G$ .
Proof. The proof easily follows from K\"onig’s duality theorem. For a bipartite graph $G$ , if $M$
is a maximum matching and $C_{V}^{\min}$ is a minimum vertex cover, then $\forall e\in M,$ $\exists!v\in C_{V}$ such
that $v\in e$ . On the other hand, $\forall v\in C_{V},$ $e\in M$ such that $v\in e$ . So, $A=M,$ $D=C_{V}^{\min}$
satisfy the three conditions of Theorem 3.2. The other direction is similar.
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